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OVERVIEW – This background paper updates NHPF Issue Brief No. 760,
“The Federal-State Medicaid Match: An Ongoing Tug-of-War over Prac-
tice and Policy,” December 15, 2000. The paper presents actions taken since
then by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of
Health and Human Services, to address what the Bush administration calls
“abusive funding practices” used by states to draw federal Medicaid match-
ing funds. Tracing the Clinton and Bush administrations’ policies, the docu-
ment reviews final regulations, published in January 2001 and January 2002,
on these practices. The paper also reports on a lawsuit filed in federal court to
block the January 2002 regulations. In addition, it explores the implications
of CMS’ actions for the federal government, as well as for the Medicaid
disproportionate-share hospital adjustment and the hospitals serving low-
income people that the adjustment was meant to protect.
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The Federal-State Struggle over
Medicaid Matching Funds:
An Update
Whether the most recent regulations affecting state Medicaid matching
funds signify the last or just the latest chapter in a two-decades-long policy
conflict is not yet clear. These regulations became effective May 14, 2002.
Certainly, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) would
like an end to the struggle over what its administrator, Thomas Scully,
has called “Medicaid scams.” The federal government’s clashes with cer-
tain states and interest groups that support them have centered on com-
plicated accounting mechanisms designed to increase states’ federal Med-
icaid matching funds even though the states raise no new dollars. The
states have labeled the mechanisms necessary to supplement their Med-
icaid budgets and protect safety-net hospitals that serve large numbers
of low-income and indigent patients. As the federal government has closed
off one mechanism after another—excessive payments to public health
facilities, donations from or taxes on providers, and maximization of dis-
proportionate-share hospital (DSH) payments—creative states have al-
ways been able to pull another out of their hats. State use of intergovern-
mental transfers (IGTs)—transferring funds from local governments and
putting up the transferred money to obtain additional federal matching
dollars—has been the central practice over the last ten years.
In the last two years, the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) in the administrations of both former President Bill Clinton and
President George W. Bush has taken action to curb state practices in draw-
ing federal Medicaid matching funds. The DHHS actions have hinged on
a Medicare-based statutory ceiling for state Medicaid payments, called
the “upper payment limit” (UPL). Because the UPL was set higher than
the amount states actually expend on care for Medicaid beneficiaries, it
provided a loophole for states to raise their federal Medicaid payments.
Having issued its proposal on October 10, 2000, the Clinton administra-
tion promulgated final regulations modifying the Medicaid UPL for hos-
pitals, nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities for the mentally re-
tarded, and clinics on January 12, 2001. In doing so, it created a new
limit—150 percent of comparable Medicare payments—that applied to
payments to hospitals owned or operated by government entities other
than the states themselves.
On January 18, 2002, the Bush administration published final regula-
tions eliminating the year-old 150 percent limit for hospitals that are
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government-owned or -operated (other than by states). This new, Bush
administration regulation subjected those hospitals to the 100 percent limit.
Both the Clinton and the Bush rules authorized transition periods for state
compliance. On March 7, 2002, shortly before the March 19 effective date
for eliminating the 150 percent limit, the National Association of Public
Hospitals and Health Systems (NAPH), American Hospital Association
(AHA), National Association of Children’s Hospitals (NACH), and Asso-
ciation of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), along with hospitals and
hospital associations in five states, filed suit against DHHS. The suit, filed
in U.S. District Court in Little Rock, sought an injunction to halt the imple-
mentation of the rule on the basis that DHHS had violated the Congres-
sional Review Act (CRA). On May 13, 2002, after the implementation date
had been delayed twice, once by DHHS and once by the court, the judge
ruled that it would become effective the next day.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S CLAMPDOWN:
JANUARY 12, 2001
In the last year of the Clinton administration, the chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee and the director of the Medicaid program in the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), now CMS, actively op-
posed states’ use of IGTs to circumvent UPLs and thereby increase their
federal Medicaid matches. The General Accounting Office, also, had con-
ducted studies indicating that states were engaging in abusive practices.
Sen. William V. Roth (R-Del.), chairman of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, and Medicaid Director Timothy Westmoreland contended that the
Medicaid UPL loophole cost the federal Medicaid program an additional
$3.7 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2000 alone. At Roth’s insistence, HCFA pub-
lished the October 10, 2000, proposed rule in the Federal Register, limiting
the practice over time but establishing the 150 percent loophole for the
government-owned and -operated (though nonstate) hospitals that serve
the poor.
Legal Justification
In the October 10, 2000, proposal, DHHS summarized existing UPL law
in the following manner:
In 1986, the Congress affirmed the use of upper limits on payments for
inpatient hospital services, nursing facility services, and [intermediate care
facility, now intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded]
services....The current upper limits were last changed in a final rule in the
Federal Register (52 FR 28141) on July 28, 1987 that addressed the applica-
tion of the UPL to states that had multiple payment rates for the same class
of services. This rule addressed the differential rate issue in the context of
state-operated facilities because several audits had revealed that the cir-
cumstances of state-operated facilities resulted in a lack of incentives to
curb excessive payments....States established payment methodologies
The chairman of the Sen-
ate Finance Committee
and the DHHS Medicaid
director contended that
the Medicaid UPL loop-
hole cost the federal
Medicaid program an ad-
ditional $3.7 billion in FY
2000 alone.
4NHPF Background Paper May 31, 2002
which paid state-owned or -operated facilities at a higher rate than
privately operated facilities. Higher Medicaid payments to state-owned
or -operated facilities allowed states to obtain additional federal Med-
icaid dollars to cover costs formerly met entirely by state dollars. To
ensure payments to state-operated facilities would be consistent with
efficiency and economy, the final rule applied the Medicare UPL test to
state-operated facilities separate from other facilities. However, the fi-
nal rule did not create a separate UPL for other government facilities,
allowing their payments to count toward the same aggregate UPL as
private facilities.1
Roth and Westmoreland indicated that this policy encouraged states to
overpay nonstate government facilities because the “states, counties, cit-
ies, and/or public providers [could], through this practice, lower current
state or local spending and/or gain extra federal matching payments.”
States could set rates for county or city facilities at substantially higher
levels than for proprietary and nonprofit facilities and obtain federal gov-
ernment matching for payments they received under those higher rates.2
An Example of Money Laundering
A transaction by Pennsylvania provides an example of how this worked.
Cited in a paper by Andy Schneider and David Rousseau, the June 14,
2000, transaction involved 23 nursing facilities operated by 20 counties:
The state Medicaid agency first calculated the amount of payments for
nursing facility services that could be made under the aggregate UPL
applicable to all nursing facilities in the state, private as well as county.
For purposes of this transaction, the amount that all nursing facilities
would be paid under Medicare principles was at least $700 million more
than the amount the state actually paid all nursing facilities, county and
private, in the aggregate for caring for Medicaid residents. Because there
was at the time no UPL for aggregate payments to county nursing facili-
ties in Pennsylvania, the state was able to pay the entire $700 million to
the county nursing facilities.
The 20 counties borrowed $695.6 million from a bank and transferred it to
the state Medicaid agency’s transaction account in the same bank. The state
Medicaid agency added a $1.5 million “transaction fee” from state funds
and transferred $697.1 million to the county bank accounts as supplemen-
tal payments to the county nursing homes for treating Medicaid patients.
The counties repaid the bank its $697.1 million and deposited the $1.5 mil-
lion transaction fee into the account of the County Commissioners Asso-
ciation of Pennsylvania. Having made this “expenditure,” the state Medic-
aid agency then claimed, and [HCFA] paid, $393.3 million in federal Med-
icaid matching funds ($697.1 multiplied by the state’s federal medical as-
sistance percentage [FMAP] of 56.4 percent). According to the Office of
Inspector General (OIG), “none of the [$697.1 million] supplementation
payments reached the participating nursing facilities, and the Medicaid
residents received no additional services. Pennsylvania retained the entire
$393,342,145 in federal financial participation to use as it pleased.”3
States could set higher
rates for county or city
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Transitions to Compliance
When Congress passed the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA), it directed HCFA to
provide—in the agency’s rule finalizing its October 10, 2000, proposed
regulations—a transition period of up to eight years for states that had
an approved plan or methodology in effect as of October 1, 1992. (The
October 10 proposal included two transition periods: until September
30, 2002, for noncompliant states with approved Medicaid state plan
amendments with an effective date on or after October 1, 1999; and
until January 1, 2005, for those with amendments approved before Oc-
tober 1, 1999.) The purpose was to help wean the states from the extra
matching funds. The final rule—published in the January 12, 2001, Fed-
eral Register—included the BIPA-mandated third transition period, so
that states with pre–FY 1993 plans had an eight-year schedule of pay-
ments. Depending upon their state Medicaid plans, states with provi-
sions approved on or after October 1, 1992, but before October 1, 1999,
had a phased payment-transition period through FY 2005 (five years);
states with provisions approved on or after October 1, 1999, were granted
a phased payment-transition period through FY 2002 (two years). (See
Table 1 for a review of the annual federal fiscal impact on states, de-
pending upon their individual transition periods.)
The Bush administration later added another provision, one affecting
states with provisions pending approval or approved after March 13, 2001.
HCFA [CMS] issued a proposed rule on April 3, 2001, and a final rule on
September 5, 2001, giving states an end-of–FY 2002 transition if they had
provisions effective after September 30, 1999, and approved before Janu-
ary 22, 2001. It provided a transition until the later of November 5, 2001,
or one year from a provision’s approval date for states with provisions
that were effective after September 30, 1999; submitted to HCFA before
March 13, 2001; and approved by HCFA [CMS] after January 21, 2001. In
a report issued October 30, 2001, GAO questioned the CMS action: “Less
than a month after the revised UPL regulation became effective, [CMS]
decided to amend the regulation to shorten the time some states were
allowed for compliance. This reversal resulted in the approval of new
financing schemes for several states that had pending proposals mimick-
ing the schemes identified last year.”4
Provisions in Effect as of March 13, 2001
The January 12, 2001, regulations, which became effective March 13, 2001,
did the following:
■ For hospitals, nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities for the
mentally retarded, and clinics, they established separate UPLs for those
that were state-owned or -operated, for public facilities that were not
state-owned or -operated, and for facilities that were privately owned
or operated.
When Congress passed
BIPA, it directed HCFA
to provide a transition
period of up to eight
years for states that
had an approved plan
or methodology in ef-
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TABLE 1
Transition Periods and Fiscal Impact of
Upper Payment Limit Programs
Maximum Transition Period
Annual Federal
State 8 year 5 year 2 year Fiscal Impact*
Alabama ✓ $141,600,000
Alaska ✓ $12,000,000
Arkansas ✓ $40,700,000
California ✓ $754,300,000
Georgia ✓ $402,500,000
Illinois ✓ $569,500,000
Indiana ✓ $136,400,000
Iowa ✓ $127,500,000
Kansas ✓ $77,800,000
Louisiana ✓ $483,000,000
Michigan ✓ $306,200,000
Minnesota ✓ $4,800,000
Missouri ✓ $76,300,000
Montana ✓ $700,000
Nebraska ✓ $55,400,000
New Hampshire ✓ $14,200,000
New Jersey ✓ $448,000,000
New Mexico ✓ $31,300,000
New York ✓ $495,800,000
North Carolina ✓ $149,600,000
North Dakota ✓ $25,900,000
Oregon ✓ $48,700,000
Pennsylvania ✓ $858,100,000
South Carolina ✓ $48,600,000
South Dakota ✓ $20,500,000
Tennessee ✓ $248,300,000
Virginia1 ✓ NA
Washington ✓ $91,500,000
Wisconsin2 ✓ $105,000,000
Total (29 States) 5 11 13 $5,774,200,000
NOTE: States in bold operate UPL programs
under more than one state plan amendment,
each of which may be subject to different tran-
sition periods. The annual federal fiscal im-
pact includes the sum of payments made un-
der all these amendments.
1 Virginia’s UPL program was not included
in the September 2001 OIG report; however,
an October 2001 GAO report estimated that
Virginia’s recently approved UPL amendment
would net the state $218 million in FY 2002.
2 Wisconsin also received approval for an ad-
ditional UPL program after the publication of
the OIG report. The GAO estimates that this
program will result in $504 million in addi-
tional federal payments to Wisconsin in FY
2002.
* These represent only the annual initial federal
payment under each state’s plan amendment(s)
as of October 2000.
Source: Andy Schneider and David Rousseau,
“Upper Payment Limits: Reality and Illu-
sion in Medicaid Financing,” Kaiser Com-
mission on Medicaid and the Uninsured Is-
sue Paper #4043, February 2002, 17; avail-
able at http://www.kkf.org. Table based on data
contained in Office of the Inspector General,
Review of Medicaid Enhanced Payments
to Local Public Providers and the Use of
Intergovernmental Transfers, A-03-00-
00216, September 2001, Appendix B.
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■ They closed the UPL loophole that allowed states to use IGTs to
obtain additional federal Medicaid matching dollars but raised the UPL
for hospitals owned or operated by government entities (other than the
states) to 150 percent of Medicare costs because of the higher expendi-
tures they were said to incur as safety-net institutions.
In the January 12, 2001, regulations, HCFA indicated:
We have identified 29 states with approved and/or pending rate propos-
als that target enhanced Medicaid payments to hospitals and NF [nurs-
ing facility] facilities that are owned or operated by county or local gov-
ernments. There are 18 states with approved state plan amendments or
waivers and 5 states with pending plan amendments. In addition, there
are 6 states that have both approved and pending plan amendments. We
estimate that these proposals currently account for approximately $4.5
billion in federal spending in FY 2001.5
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S ULTIMATE STAND:
JANUARY 18, 2002
The Bush administration’s FY 2002 budget included a proposal to further
limit state use of the UPL loophole, for an estimated saving of $606 million
in FY 2002 and $17.3 billion in FY 2002 through FY 2011.6 While opposing
the loophole, DHHS nonetheless approved UPL amendments to certain
states’ Medicaid plans. Examples include Florida, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
The administration started on a regulatory route to limit the practice in
August 2001. Shortly after he took over as administrator of the newly
named CMS, Scully announced that he “planned to reduce the [Medic-
aid] UPL to 100 percent of Medicare rates.” In October 2001, he sent eight
hospital organizations a letter saying that CMS had new UPL regulations
under consideration but not specifically targeting the 100 percent limit.7
A Proposal to Stand Firm and a Response from Congress
CMS published a proposed rule in the November 23, 2001, Federal Regis-
ter to modify the Medicaid UPL provisions by removing the 150 percent
UPL for inpatient and outpatient hospital services furnished by public
hospitals that were not owned or operated by state governments. In issu-
ing the proposal, CMS indicated that it was “part of this Administration’s
efforts to restore fiscal integrity to the Medicaid program and reduce the
opportunity for abusive funding practices based on payments unrelated
to actual covered Medicaid services.”8 A couple of days before the pro-
posed regulations appeared, CMS sent a letter to the states, indicating
that it would not approve any state plan amendments that allowed pay-
ments in excess of this limit.
In response, at the end of 2001, Congress included language in the report
to the FY 2002 appropriations measure for the Departments of Labor,
Health and Human Services, and Education (Labor/HHS/Education)
The Bush administration’s
FY 2002 budget included
a proposal to further
limit state use of the UPL
loophole.
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urging CMS to assess the proposal’s implementation and consult with
the states and other stakeholders about it. Moreover, Rep. Nathan Deal
(R-Ga.) and Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D-Ark.) introduced companion legis-
lation in late November 2001 to delay until “at least January 1, 2003, any
changes in Medicaid regulations that modify the Medicaid UPL for
nonstate government-owned or -operated hospitals.”9
Finalization of the Administration’s Position
The Bush administration’s ultimate stand came early the next year, when
CMS published the final rule in the January 18, 2002, Federal Register. In
line with the proposed regulations, the final version lowered the UPL for
nonstate government-owned or -operated hospitals from 150 percent to
100 percent. The regulations, which were to have been effective March
19, 2002,10 provided for the following:
■ They closed the loophole for hospitals that are government-owned or
-operated (though not by state governments) so that the hospitals could
receive 100 percent—rather than 150 percent—of the UPL for services to
Medicaid patients. They therefore removed the special recognition such
hospitals had been given by the January 12, 2001, regulation.
■ They retained the transition periods that had been established by the
January 12 and September 5, 2001, rules. However, they made clear that
these transition periods would not apply to the reduction (which was to
be effective March 19, 2002) of the UPL from 150 percent to 100 percent.
CMS justified the regulations in this way:11
■ It indicated that a higher UPL is not necessary “to achieve the objec-
tive of assuring access for Medicaid beneficiaries at public hospitals.” It
contended that the 100 percent UPL would be sufficient to assure access
and that states would have “some flexibility to make enhanced pay-
ments to selected public hospitals” under this limit.
■ It asserted that it did “not believe that the higher payments are
necessarily being used to further the mission of these hospitals or their
role in serving Medicaid patients.” It based this on OIG reports
demonstrating that
a portion of the enhanced payments made as part of the UPL process
are being transferred directly back to the state via IGTs and used for
other purposes (which may include funding the state share of other
Medicaid expenditures). In cases for which hospitals did retain UPL-
related enhanced payments, the OIG found that these same hospitals
either did not receive DSH payments or, if they did, typically returned
the DSH payments directly back to the state through IGTs.
■ It said that “many of the public safety net hospitals affected by this
rule qualify as DSH hospitals” and that BIPA had increased the limits
for state Medicaid DSH payments (see section on “Medicaid DSH’s
Connection to the Medicaid Match Issue”).
The final, January 18,
2002, version of the rule
lowered the UPL for
nonstate government-
owned or -operated hos-
pitals from 150% to
100%.
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■ It stated that it wished to “restore payment equity among hospital
providers and across other provider types.”
■ It summed up: “The main result is that the federal government is
effectively paying more than its share of state Medicaid expenditures.”
As a result, states could claim federal matching funds for reimbursing
Medicaid providers up to—but no more than—100 percent of what Medi-
care would pay for such services.
THE JUDICIARY AS ARBITER: DELAY BUT NOT
BLOCKAGE OF THE JANUARY 18, 2002, FINAL
REGULATIONS
Charging that the Bush administration’s January 18 rule would “jeopar-
dize health care services for the poor, uninsured, and disabled,” the NAPH,
AHA, NACH, and AAMC, along with hospital associations and hospi-
tals in the states of Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, and New York,
filed suit on March 7, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Arkansas to prevent the rule’s scheduled March 19 implementa-
tion. According to a joint press release, the suit “sought an injunction to
halt arbitrary and capricious Medicaid UPL rules that result in disabling
cuts to the Medicaid program—totaling $27 billion over ten years.” The
plaintiffs contended that DHHS “in promulgating the final UPL
rules...made an arbitrary and capricious decision that will cause irrepa-
rable harm to the nation’s public hospitals and the patients they serve.”12
Specifically, the organizations charged that DHHS had violated the Con-
gressional Review Act by not giving the House of Representatives and
Senate the review periods mandated under the law.
According to GAO, the CRA “requires that an agency promulgating a
major rule must delay the effective date for 60 days from the date of
publication in the Federal Register or receipt of the rule by Congress,
whichever is later.” The House received the rule on February 14, 2002,
and the Senate received it on March 15. Because each body of Congress
has to receive a rule before the 60-day counting begins, the UPL rule
could not become effective until May 14, 2002—60 days after the Senate
received it on March 15—rather than on March 19, the date announced
by CMS.13
Moreover, in filing the suit, the associations referred to language Con-
gress had included in the report to the FY 2002 Labor/HHS/Education
appropriations measure requesting that the administration “carefully
consider the impact of any change in special public hospital payments.”
NAPH President Larry Gage, asserting that the rules would “cause a
massive financial devastation of the nation’s public hospitals,” accused
DHHS of giving “the hospitals and the Congress short shrift [by push-
ing] these funding cuts through in violation of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (APA).”14
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Earlier, DHHS, responding to comments to the proposed regulations,
had indicated in the January 18, 2002, final regulations that it had not
violated the APA in changing its position from the one it had adopted a
year before:
Comment: One commenter suggested that we have not met the require-
ments of the APA in publishing this rule. The commenter noted that rel-
evant case law regarding the APA permits an agency to change a regula-
tion if it can demonstrate good cause for making the change and can clearly
explain the reasons for its departure from its prior stance. The commenter
noted that before the January 12, 2001, rule took effect, the President an-
nounced a proposal to modify this UPL. The commenter believes we can-
not articulate a reasonable basis for our policy reversal and, as a result,
we cannot meet the requirements of the APA.
Response: We disagree. In publishing this rule, we have adhered to the
law. In publishing this rule, we have based our actions on a review of the
OIG reports pertaining to UPL payments as well as our own review of
the new state plan amendments submitted after the January 2002 rule
took effect and our further analysis of the requirements of the Medicaid
statute. This additional information and analysis underlay the President’s
proposal to modify the UPL, and the proposal has been promulgated using
full notice and comment procedures. Therefore, this regulatory action to
modify the UPL does not violate the APA.15
However, after the lawsuit was filed, DHHS postponed implementation
of the effective date by one month. On April 10, based on the department’s
failure to follow the CRA, the federal judge ordered an additional 30-day
delay in implementation, bringing the new effective date to May 14, 2002.
According to the American Hospital Association, the two delays resulted
in an additional $300 million in payments that hospitals otherwise would
not have received.16 Having lost the lawsuit, the interest groups turned
their attention to Congress, both for resolutions of disapproval in both
houses and for legislation to overturn the regulations.
MEDICAID DSH’S CONNECTION TO THE MEDICAID
MATCH ISSUE
Medicaid DSH funds have been central to the Medicaid match struggle
between the federal and state governments because states have used cre-
ative accounting mechanisms—mainly provider donations, provider taxes,
and IGTs—to obtain funds from hospitals for their portion of DSH pay-
ments. “It should be noted that use of such mechanisms is largely restricted
to financing the DSH program,” Teresa A. Coughlin, Leighton Ku, and
Johnny Kim write in a paper on the Medicaid DSH program published by
the Urban Institute in January 2000.17 They explain, as follows:
Generally, states finance their share of other parts of the Medicaid program
(such as inpatient hospital care, physician care, and the like) with monies
from state general revenue. While several states [for example, the large
states California and New York] require local government participation in
11
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supporting the Medicaid program, local financing has not historically
relied on financing mechanisms used to fund DSH.18
The authors offer the following example:
A typical transaction might begin with a state receiving $10 million in
revenue—in the form of a tax, IGT, or CPE [certified public expenditure]—
from a hospital. The state would then make a $12 million DSH payment
back to the provider. Assuming the state has a 50 percent federal match-
ing rate, the state would get $6 million in federal Medicaid funds. At the
end of the transaction, the provider would have netted $2 million ($12
million minus $10 million) in DSH payments, all from federal funds. The
state has thus received $4 million in federal money without spending
any of its own funds. The federal government has paid $6 million in DSH
payments, but only $2 million has actually been gained by the hospital.19
Whereas the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) had cut Medicaid DSH
funding, BIPA increased state DSH allotments. It provided that a state’s FY
2001 allotment would be equal to what it received for FY 2000, increased
by the percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI) for that year,
subject to a ceiling equal to 12 percent of the state’s total medical assistance
expenditures for FY 2000. For FY 2002, the allotment would equal the
amount the state received in FY 2000, increased by the CPI for FY 2001,
subject to a ceiling equal to 12 percent of its total medical expenditures in
that year. BIPA also included a formula increase for low-DSH states.
In addition, BIPA applied to all states a provision that was in the BBA and
extended by the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Re-
finement Act of 1999 (BBRA). The BBA authorized DSH payments for
hospitals in California up to a ceiling of 175 percent of the cost of care
provided to Medicaid recipients and individuals with no health insur-
ance or other third-party coverage for services during the year (the net of
nondisproportionate share Medicaid payments and other payments by
uninsured individuals). The BBRA indefinitely extended the provision,
which was set to expire July 1, 1999, and BIPA, as noted, made it appli-
cable to other states. BIPA also included funds (in addition to DSH pay-
ments) for certain public hospitals not owned or operated by a state; not
receiving DSH payments as of October 1, 2000; and with utilization by
low-income persons greater than 65 percent.
While CMS has moved to reduce UPL gimmicks, including those involv-
ing use of DSH funds, Congress has acted to increase DSH funding,
roughly within the same time period. In justifying its UPL restrictions,
CMS has cited the DSH increases as cushions for safety-net hospitals. It is
important to note that, now that UPL appears to be settled, at least for the
time being, DSH payments are at issue. Some legislators are indicating
that they would like to raise the 175 percent DSH ceiling that BIPA made
applicable to all states. Policy people on both sides of the UPL debate
seem to agree that it is much more straightforward for Congress and CMS
to address state Medicaid funding shortfalls directly through DSH (or
While CMS has moved
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through FMAP) rather than to have a tug-of-war with states over UPL
and other loopholes in federal Medicaid regulations.
OBJECTORS’ PREDICTIONS OF THE IMPACT ON THE
STATES AND THEIR MEDICAID POPULATIONS
Individually and jointly, various hospital associations, policy groups, and
other organizations have objected to the UPL restrictions. Most recently,
in comments to the Bush administration’s proposed regulations, in let-
ters to Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson and to
Scully, in press releases and interviews, and in publicity surrounding their
legal attempt to block the January 2002 regulations, they have used vari-
ous rationales.
The dominant rationale centers on inadequate Medicaid funding. As a
result of the decline in the economy, states are facing budget deficits this
fiscal year. According to the National Governors Association, the deficits
are expected to be between $35 billion and $50 billion. Reducing the UPL
for public hospitals not owned or operated by state governments, and
thereby decreasing states’ Medicaid matching funds, exacerbates the
states’ plight.20 A survey by the National Conference of State Legislatures
on states’ health priorities for 2002 showed that “42 states will address
Medicaid budget shortfalls, 40 states will attempt to maximize federal
Medicaid payments, 37 states will review Medicaid reimbursement rates,
37 states will explore using Medicaid waivers, and 28 states will consider
cutting Medicaid benefit packages.”21
Another key rationale focuses on potential damage to the safety net. Re-
moving the 150 percent category reduces “state flexibility to increase pay-
ments to public safety net hospitals” and takes funds “from Medicaid
providers who use the funds to provide care to Medicaid patients.”22
Moreover, the reduction of the UPL will have an adverse effect on “the
health care safety net in specific states.” It could result in hospitals cut-
ting services or closing. It could reduce “access to critically needed health
services for the uninsured, including immigrants and working families.”23
Still another rationale—the basis for the interest groups’ lawsuit—is based
on procedural grounds. As noted, one ground is alleged violation of the
APA. According to this argument, the January 18, 2002, regulations su-
persede an agreement between Congress and the Clinton administration
that was part of BIPA and the January 12, 2001, regulations that took ef-
fect in March 2001. That legislation called for states to report how they
were spending Medicaid funds; CMS moved ahead without evaluating
the states’ responses.24 Moreover, the FY 2002 Labor/HHS/Education
appropriations also instructed CMS to give the matter careful consider-
ation. The other ground is violation of the CRA—not giving adequate
review time to the House and Senate—which seemingly was taken care
of by the DHHS- and court-ordered delays in implementation and the
federal judge’s final ruling on the interest group lawsuit.
Reducing the UPL for
public hospitals not
owned or operated
by state governments,
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A final argument relates to the Clinton and Bush administrations’ charges
that states are using Medicaid UPL payments for non-Medicaid purposes.
This is countered by OIG and Urban Institute reviews contending “that
safety net hospitals retain UPL payments to a significant extent. In two of
the three states reviewed, the OIG found that at least two-thirds of UPL
payments remained with the public hospitals.”25 The persuasiveness of
“a significant extent” and “at least two-thirds” seemingly is in the eye of
the beholder, because, as indicated, CMS also used the OIG review to
justify its position in the January 18, 2002, final regulations.
THE PAST AS PROLOGUE
The federal-state struggle over Medicaid matching funds is largely a saga
of gimmicks that states have used to address their own budget problems
over the last decade. In 2002, “states are in a somewhat tougher situation
[than in the past] because DSH has been capped and UPL must shrink, so
they have fewer gimmicks available,” according to Leighton Ku of the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. “New proposals to temporarily
increase FMAP could serve as a pressure relief valve to help states.” (For
example, the National Governors Association contends that a temporary
increase, even of a couple of percentage points, would benefit states con-
siderably.) In Ku’s view, the new FMAP proposal “is a straightforward
and non-gimmicky way to get fiscal relief, as compared to mechanisms
like DSH and UPL. Part of the underlying problem is that the FMAP
formula does not properly act in a countercyclical fashion.”26
While Washington, D.C., and state capitals are used to extended de-
bates over policy issues, the IGT UPL controversy has been particularly
wearing. More often than not, it has focused on the implications of ban-
ning what states readily admit are accounting schemes rather than on
the intent and substance of Medicaid law and regulation. The contro-
versy also has highlighted states’ ingenuity and ingenuousness in inter-
preting federal and even state laws and their implementation by regula-
tion. Whether the debate that a federal judge has just “settled” leads to
another chapter in the raising of state Medicaid matching funds or be-
comes part of a larger debate on federal and state Medicaid reforms
remains to be seen.
____________________________
Many thanks to those who contributed to this background paper by providing
information and/or reviewing the final document. Kathy Allen and Tim Bushfield
of the General Accounting Office made numerous helpful suggestions and rec-
ommended additional citations drawn on GAO’s work. Leighton Ku of the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities provided thoughtful comments, as well,
and permitted the Forum to use a particularly pertinent DSH example. David
Rousseau of the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured reviewed
the document and, along with Andy Schneider of Medicaid Policy, LLC, graciously
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allowed NHPF to cite a UPL example and reprint a table from a recent paper on
UPL. While these and other experts on UPL, as credited in the paper, contributed to
the final product, the Forum bears final responsibility for its contents.
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SOME DEFINITIONS
Certified public expenditure (CPE)—An expenditure certified by a pub-
lic agency to represent its contribution in providing care to Medicaid
recipients or uninsured persons.
Federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP)—The federal share of
Medicaid, based on the relationship between each state’s per capita per-
sonal income and the national average per capita personal income over
three calendar years; recalculated every year.
Intergovernmental transfer (IGT)—A transfer of funds from one level
of government to another. In the context of this background paper, a
transfer of funds from local government to state government so that the
state Medicaid program may use the local transfer as part of state funds
that draw federal Medicaid matching dollars.
Medicaid disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) program—Enacted
in 1981, a provision for state Medicaid programs to make payments to
“take into account the situation of hospitals which serve a dispropor-
tionate number of low-income patients with special needs.”
Medicaid match—The match of federal Medicaid funds to state Medic-
aid dollars, which is designed, roughly, to even out federal Medicaid
spending per Medicaid recipient (the current federal matching formula
varies by state, with poorer states receiving more generous matching than
richer states). Usually expressed in percentages, e.g., 50 percent federal,
50 percent state matching.
Medicare disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) adjustment—Enacted
in 1983, an add-on to the diagnosis-related-group rate under the Medi-
care prospective payment system, “to take into account the special
needs...of public or other hospitals that serve a significantly dispropor-
tionate number of patients who have low income or are entitled to ben-
efits under Part A [the Medicare hospital program].”
Upper payment limit (UPL)—A restriction on states from making Med-
icaid payments that are higher than reasonable estimates of the amounts
the Medicare program would pay for the same services.
17
NHPF Background Paper May 31, 2002
Looking Back
The UPL controversy delineated in this background paper is one of a
series of disputes between the federal government and state govern-
ments over attempts by the states to drive up the federal Medicaid match-
ing funds they receive. In the mid-1980s, DHHS objected to states’ mak-
ing excessive payments to state-owned or -operated health facilities in
order to increase their federal Medicaid matching funds. Regulations
promulgated in 1987 restricted this practice by establishing UPLs for
state inpatient and institutional facilities.
States’ use of provider donations and provider taxes to increase their
federal Medicaid matching funds became an issue in the late 1980s. HCFA
had published a regulation in 1985 that allowed donations, both public
and private, to be sources of states’ share of Medicaid. Moreover, the
agency had put out a Medicaid manual instruction on provider taxes in
1987 that distinguished between taxes of general applicability (imposed
on all kinds of goods and services and not just Medicaid providers) and
provider-specific taxes (imposed only on health care providers). In gen-
eral, the first could be used to draw federal Medicaid matching funds
and the second could not.
Estimates by HCFA and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) indicated
that the state provider donation and provider tax programs “cost the fed-
eral government nearly $500 million in FY 1990,” according to a 1993
NHPF issue brief. By 1991, “the amount of revenue generated from state
provider donation or tax programs was approximately $2.3 billion in fed-
eral funds” and was rapidly rising.1
HCFA, the OIG, and Congress investigated what they viewed as schemes
by the states to increase their federal Medicaid matching funds without
increasing their own contributions. A comprehensive report, Medicaid
Provider Tax and Donation Issues, prepared for the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation in 1992 by Health Policy Alternatives, Inc., documented the
issues, the federal and state perspectives on them, and the practices. The
report also provided case studies on Connecticut, Delaware, Pennsylva-
nia, Tennessee, and Texas.2
Tennessee offered a good example of the use of revenues from both pro-
vider donations and provider taxes. Beginning in 1987, when the Tennes-
see legislature authorized the practice, Tennessee used revenues from
provider donations to draw federal dollars, according to Gordon
Bonnyman, author of that state’s case study. The state faced a rapidly
increasing Medicaid budget, which grew from slightly more than $1 bil-
lion in FY 1988 to nearly $2.3 billion in 1992. The growth was due to
several factors. One factor was the state’s commitment to expansion of
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indigent care and state aid for certain high-volume Medicaid hospi-
tals. Another involved federal statutory changes (such as expanded
coverage for low-income mothers and children). Yet another was health
care inflation.3
That first year, 30 of Tennessee’s 150 hospitals donated $19 million. The
largest donor was Regional Medical Center in Memphis, which was the
largest public hospital in the state. Because the state’s federal Medicaid
percentage was 70 percent (that is, the federal government paid 70 cents
and the state paid 30 cents), the $19 million generated approximately $63
million, Bonnyman reported. Of the $63 million, $24 million increased
Medicaid DSH subsidies, $31 million went to expanded Medicaid cover-
age for pregnant women and children who were below 100 percent of the
federal poverty level, and the balance provided a rise from 14 to 20 days
in the annual inpatient hospital coverage limit. Most of the subsidies went
to the providers that had provided the donations.4
When HCFA disallowed most of the matching funds raised by the dona-
tions, Tennessee, while appealing the disallowance and continuing with
its donation policy, turned to a provider tax—a hospital gross receipts
tax—as a means of increasing its federal matching funds. Because some
hospitals opposed the tax, the state and the hospital industry agreed in-
stead on sharp increases in hospital licensing fees. The legislature ap-
proved the hospital license fee policy in 1989 and extended the mecha-
nism to nursing homes in 1990.5
Meanwhile, the DHHS Departmental Appeals Board had reversed HCFA’s
disallowance of the donations mechanism. Therefore, Tennessee had both
the donations and the provider tax options open to it.
As more states moved to take advantage of the provider donation and
tax policies, HCFA became more and more concerned. As it considered
revising the 1985 regulation and the 1987 instruction, Congress—spurred
by the states—in 1989 and 1990 imposed moratoria on actions by HCFA.
After considerable debate during 1991, the Medicaid Voluntary Contri-
bution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991 were enacted, ban-
ning provider donations and restricting provider taxes as mechanisms
for states to draw federal Medicaid matching dollars.
The 1991 legislation also included provisions limiting the growth of Med-
icaid DSH payments to the level of overall program expenditures and
capping Medicaid DSH payments at 12 percent. Since enactment of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987, DSH (enacted in
1981) had become an attractive mechanism for states because they could
exceed the UPL in providing funds to hospitals that provided high vol-
umes of care to low-income patients. The 1987 legislation both required
states to make the payment adjustments to qualified hospitals and estab-
lished minimum criteria for them to follow in doing so. Subsequent legis-
lation, OBRA 1993, provided that only those hospitals that had Medicaid
utilization of at least 1 percent could receive DSH payments. The act
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also prohibited states from paying hospitals more than they were losing
through low Medicaid reimbursement rates or uncompensated care.
Both the 1991 and the 1993 laws had a chilling effect on states’ DSH
payments to hospitals and on states’ Medicaid programs. Medicaid had
grown “at an extraordinary 27.1 percent annual growth rate, with ex-
penditures increasing from $73.7 billion to $119.9 billion in just two years”
between 1990 and 1992, according to a September 1998 Urban Institute
study. “[Medicaid] DSH payments grew at an average annual rate of
263 percent, accounting for about $1.3 billion in 1988 and growing to
more than $17 billion by 1992.” From 1995 to 1996, in contrast, the growth
rate fell to -19.6 percent, reflecting efforts to curb the program.6
As states changed their DSH programs to comply with the 1993 legisla-
tion, which became effective for different categories of hospitals in 1994
and in 1995, they began to turn to IGTs, shifting funds between differ-
ent levels of government. “For the DSH program, many states began to
transfer funds from public institutions such as state psychiatric facilities,
university hospitals, and county or metropolitan hospitals to the state
Medicaid agency.” The state then provided DSH payments to the facili-
ties and received federal Medicaid matching funds in the process.7 HCFA,
the OIG, and Congress—especially the Senate Finance Committee and
the General Accounting Office—then turned their attention to states’
use of IGTs in order to avoid UPL restrictions and claim federal match-
ing on the transferred funds. This is the background for the IGT-UPL
debate that has involved CMS (the former HCFA), Congress, and inter-
est groups since 2000.
ENDNOTES
1. Debra Lipson, “The Question behind the Medicaid Provider Tax Debate: What Consti-
tutes a State Dollar?” Issue Brief No. 625, National Health Policy Forum, Washington, D.C.,
July 12, 1993, 4.
2. Medicaid Provider Tax and Donation Issues, Health Policy Alternatives, Inc., Washington,
D.C., July 1992.
3. Gordon Bonnyman, “Tennessee’s Use of Provider Donations and Taxes to Finance Its
Medicaid Program,” Medicaid Provider Tax and Donation Issues, Health Policy Alternatives,
Inc., Washington, D.C., July 1992, 2.
4. Bonnyman, “Tennessee’s Use,” 4.
5. Bonnyman, “Tennessee’s Use,” 5–7.
6. John Holahan, Brian Bruen, and David Liska, “The Decline in Medicaid Spending
Growth in 1996: Why Did It Happen?” Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., September 1998,
1–2; accessed February 15, 2002, at http://www.urban.org/authors/holahan.html.
7. Teresa Coughlin and David Liska, “The Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital
Payment Program: Background and Issues,” Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., October
1997, 4–5; accessed February 15, 2002, at http://www.urban.org/authors/coughlin.html.
